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Commission of Utah ; Donald Hacking
and W. R. McEntire, members of said
Public Service Commission of Utah,
and Frank A. Yeamans, Secretary of
said Public Service Commission of
Utah, and THE DENVER & RIO
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD
COMPANY,
Defendants.
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PROVO CITY, a municipal corporation,
Petitioner,
vs.
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH, Hal S. Bennett,
Chairman of the said Public Service
Commission of Utah; Donald Hacking
and W. R. McEntire, members of said
Public Service Commission of Utah,
and Frank A. Yeamans, Secretary of
said Public Service Commission of
Utah, and THE DENVER & RIO
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD
COMPANY,
Defendants.
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In this brief parties to this action may sometimes be
designated as follows: petitioner, Provo City, as "the City,"
defendant Public Service Commission of Utah as "the Commission," and defendant The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company as "the Rio Grande."
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Subsequent to the filing of the brief of the City in this
case, a stipulation was entered into between the parties to
the effect that copies of certain instruments on file in the
action in the United States District Court for the District
of Utah wherein the City and the Rio Grande or its Trustees
were parties and on file in proceedings before the Commission wherein Rio Grande is applicant might be made a part
of the record in this case with the same effect as if incorporated in a petition, answer or other pleading of a party
herein. Copies of these instruments are now before this
Court pursuant to said stipulation. The pages of these instruments are numbered 1 to 54, inclusive, and will be referred to by such page numbers in this brief as part of the
record herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
We believe the following facts, in addition to those set
forth in the brief of the City, are necessary to a complete
· understanding of the issues· presented in this case.
The negotiations between the City and the Rio Grande
covering the whole problem here involved, conducted in 19,43,
had two aspects, the first being that the street area crossed
by the railroad tracks then existing and to be constructed
would be vacated, the second being that in lieu of the Ninth
South Street area to be so vacated, there should be established, at the cost and expense of the Rio Grande, another
public street, which would have the effect of taking the place
of the Ninth South Street crossing. This substituted street
or cut-off would extend from Ninth South Street northwesterly to Fifth East Street. By this shift in roadway, westbound traffic on Ninth South Street would be diverted
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through the cut-off into Fifth East Street and by way of
University Avenue around the crossing, entering Ninth
South Street at a point west of the crossing. Eastbound traffic on Ninth South Street would proceed in the reverse direction. In this way the same end result was achieved as
though some other means of crossing, such as a grade separation, had been constructed. Although this road was circuitous, it had the distinct advantage of saving the traveling
public from the danger to life and limb which would result
from public use of the Ninth South crossing. The Rio Grande
performed its part of the proposal by acquiring and laying
out the cut-off road. This road in lieu of the Ninth South
crossing has been used by the traveling public since 1943
(R. 3-4, 31-32).
Prior to construction of the railroad tracks which were
built in 1943, there were four main line tracks across Ninth
South Street in Provo, being from east to west those of the
Salt Lake & Utah railroad, Denver and Rio Grande Western
railroad, Utah railway, and Union Pacific railroad, and also
four additional tracks crossing said street, one of the Denver
, and Rio Grande Western railroad, two of Utah railway, and
· one of the Union Pacific railroad. When the additional railroad construction of 1943 had been completed, there were
~~ a total of twenty-one railroad tracks in or across Baid street,
eight of which had been constructed by the Trustees of Rio
~1 Grande (R. 5). The tracks of Rio Grande across Ninth South
Street form a part of its Provo freight yards and are used
and employed by it in the movement of freight traffic pass~ ing through, destined to, and originating in the Provo area

l

I

(R. 5)

0

~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

The railroad tracks in question do not extend along
Ninth South Street but cross the street, some at approximately right angles and others on a bearing of approximately
north 54 o west. The street area crossed by the railroad
tracks in question was not within the original townsite area
of Provo City. The fee to this street area is in the abutting
property owners, and the right of public travel over this
street area arose from user. Railroad companies are the
owners in fee of the abutting property ( R. 9) .
The area of said street crossed and occupied by said
railroad tracks was physically closed to travel by the erection of barricades in May, 1943 (R. 30). The crossing has
not been opened since that date and remains closed at this
time.
The location of the tracks, the street area which is now
closed, and surrounding streets and areas are graphically
shown upon the print attached to this brief and made a part
thereof as Appendix A.
ARGUMENT
The City here seeks a permanent writ, prohibiting the
Commission from conducting a proceeding upon the application of the Rio Grande ( R. 35-38) now before it.

The City's petition for an alternative writ of prohibition sets forth substantially the same facts as those con- "
tained in its brief. The defendants, by demurrer interposed
herein, raise the issue of the sufficiency in law of the City's
petition.
The office of the writ of prohibition has been defined
by this Court as being a process by which a superior court
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prevents an inferior court or tribunal from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which it has not been invested
by law and to arrest it from exercising a want or an excess
of legal jurisdiction and not to prevent or correct an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction. Campbell et al. v. Durand, 39
Utah 118, 115 P. 986.
No question of fact is or properly can be involved. The
facts are presented here as a means of determining the issue
of law. That issue, as we see it, is simply the single question
as to whether the Commission has jurisdiction to entertain
and act upon the application of the Rio Grande now before it.
The City attacks the jurisdiction of the Commission
upon three grounds, namely: (1) that the application before
the Commission is a subterfuge to avoid the issue of jurisdiction of the Commission to order the closing of a city street
where railroad tracks cross it; (2) that the Public Utilities
Act does not give the Commission jurisdiction to order the
closing of a public street within a municipality; and (3)
that there is a constitutional restraint upon the jurisdiction
of the Commission. We shall consider the contentions of the
City in the same order as presented by it.
POINT I
As we analyze the contentions of the City under this
point, two propositions are advanced by it, namely : ( 1) the
Rio Grande, by its application, has assumed that the Ninth
South crossing is closed, whereas, in legal contemplation,
it is now open; and (2) the Commission cannot assume jurisdiction because the issues which Rio Grande seeks to bring
before it are res judicata.
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It is recognized by all parties to this action that the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit
determined that the City was not estopped to deny that the
street area of Ninth South occupied by r~ilroad tracks had
been vacated. No dispute does or can exist as to the determination of that court.
Equally clear, however, is the fact that the Ninth South
Street crossing has been physically closed for more than six
years. The public has not used the street area occupied by
railroad tr~cks since May, 1943. In fact the public never
has used the crossing which now exists. When the public
last used this street area there were but eight tracks across
the street. Now there are some twenty-one tracks, in or
across said street, constituting a part of a busy freight yard,
accommodating a large volume of railroad traffic. The public has never experienced the hazard and the danger to life
and limb which would necessarily flow from the public use
of this crossing, nor have the railroads experienced the effect
on their operations of forcing this cross~ng open.
The Rio Grande, in its application now pending before
the Commission and in exhibits attached thereto, fully set
forth the pertinent facts and the contentions of the City
theretofore made (R. 35-54). The Rio Grande has not intended anywhere in this long and difficult controversy to
engage in subterfuge or sophistry. The form of the application seems to it not to be material as two propositions must
be admitted by all : First, that the City has not vacated the
street area in question, and, second, that the present street
area has never been opened to a crossing of the railroad
tracks and facilities which are now located therein. It seems
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also to be equally clear that if the Commission grants relief
as prayed for by the Rio Grande, the Commission will refuse
to open for public travel a street crossing now physic·ally
closed, and the Commission will by its order close a crossing
now open in contemplation of law.
,If it be said that the Commission's order in granting the
relief sought by the Rio Grande would have the effect of
closing a street crossing now open in contemplation of law,
then one of the essential elements which the Commission
must necessarily consider in such a determination will be the
fact that no public travel has ever been conducted over such
crossing and that the public has never been subjected to the
hazard and danger incident to the use of such crossing.

The test of jurisdiction after all is the power lawfully
to deal with the general subject involved in the proceeding:
The general subject here involved is railroad track crossings
of a city street. The Commission is undertaking to deal with
the subject by ordering the crossing opened or closed.
The form in which Rio Grande set forth the facts and in
which it couched its prayer for relief before the Commission
cannot seriou·sly be contended to bear upon the jurisdiction
of the Commission. The Commission's inquiry will be dedicated to a consideration as to whether from all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the controversy public convenience and necessity require that the Ninth South Street crossing be made available for public travel. The manner in
which the inquiry is instituted is a matter of form. The substance of the Commission's jurisdiction is found in the subject matter of the inquiry and what the Commission under-
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takes to do. All parties are here earnestly endeavoring to
determine the jurisdiction of the Commission in such a matter. If the City believes that question of jurisdiction may be
more simply stated in a proposition which inquires whether
the Commission has power and jurisdiction to order closed
the street crossing in question, defendants are willing
that the question be so posed and are not inclined to quibble
over the form in which the application was presented to the
Commission by the Rio Grande. Certainly the jurisdiction of
the Commission will not depend upon the form of the petition or 'application brought before it but rather upon the
substance of what the Commission undertakes to do.
The second proposition advanced by the City under this
point requires more detailed consideration. The Rio Grande
brought suit against the City in the United States District
Court of Utah upon the theory that the acts of the City complained of by it estopped the City from denying th~t the
street area in question had been vacated, the contention of
the Rio Grande being in substance that the acts of the City
were such that its position was the same as though the
street area had been vacated by ordinance. The trial court
in its findings so concluded. On the appeal to the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, the same
issues were presented. Judge Bratton who wrote the majority opinion stated the problem thus :
... The company filed proceedings to enjoin the
city, the mayor, and the commissioners from proceeding further in that direction. Is1sues were joined, and
the causes were tried to the court upon stipulated
facts, documentary evidence, and oral testimony. Coneluding that the defendants and all citizens and resi-
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9
dents of Provo were estopped from alleging or contending that the street had not been closed, vacated,
and abandoned as required by law, the court entered
judgments enjoining the defendants from. interfering
with the barricades and from reopening the street.
The defendants appealed (R. 16).
Judge Phillips, who dissented, in viewing the case in the
same way observed :

It seems to me that the instant case is one where
right and justice require a holding that the city is
estopped to reopen Ninth South Street across the
yards at the ground level (R. 22).
The result of the litigation in the federal court was
therefore a determination that Provo City was not estopped
by its acts to deny that the street area had been vacated.
What is the issue before the Commission on the Rio
Grande's pending application? The issue thus presented, as
we see it, is whether public convenience and necessity require
the Ninth South Street crossing to be closed. Thus it is seen
that while public rights were incidentally involved in the
action before the federal court, the real issue there involved private rights between the City on the one hand
and the railroad companies on the other, while the issue
before the Commission, although touching private rights,
is primarily concerned with questions of public policy.
The division of jurisdiction between the court and the
Commission is therefore sharply defined and of peculiar importance in the case now before this Court. The jurisdiction
of the Commission is in a measure much broader than that
of the court. In proceedings before the Commission the
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questions are primarily and essentially public questions. An
examination of Section 76-4-15, U. C. A. 1943, which will
be considered in further detail hereafter, demonstrates legislative intent that the Commis sion in acting thereunder
should engage in considerations of a public character. It is
therefore S<een that not the rights of the railroad companies,
alone or of the City as such are essentially involved in the
application now pending before the Commission but rather
the rights of the public generally, which rights embrace not
only those of residents of Provo City and Utah ·County but
those of all persons who may be affected by the determinations which are made by the Commission with respect to
the crossing involved.
1

Both the court and the Commission have been careful
to recognize the jurisdiction of the other in the proceedings
which have already been taken. Thus the federal court in
its judgment concluded that:
4. Under the provisions of Section 76-4-15, subsection 3, Utah Code Annotated 1943, the Public Service Commission of Utah has jurisdiction, if it finds
that public convenience and necessity demand the
establishment, creation or construction of a crossing
of a street or highway above or under the railroad
tracks of the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad, to require the establishment of such a crossing
and such crossing may thereupon become a public
highway and crossing. This Court is not disposed
to interfere with the exercise of such jurisdiction and
power of the Public Service Commission either as to
the Trustees or T'he Denver and Rio Grande Western
Railroad Company, but on the contrary is disposed
and will use its good offices to aid in the elimination
'of inconvenience to the public caused by barricading
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of Ninth South Street, at the earliest possible time
consistent with the war effort, by construction at
or near Ninth South Street or University Avenue of
some divided grade crossing when labor and materials become available therefor (R. 12).
and in its decree further ordered that:
... provided, however, that neither Provo City
nor any of its officers, agents, residents or persons
is enjoined from petitioning the Public Service Commission of Utah to exercise its jurisdiction, under
Section 76-4-15, subsection 3, Utah Code Annotated
1943, by finding that public convenience and necessity require, and by ordering the ·establishment of a
crossing of a street or highway above or under the
tracks of the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad at or in the vicinity of Ninth South Street or
University Avenue ... (R. 14).
The Commission in its report in the first proceeding
before it is careful to point out the area of its jurisdiction
and that of the court where it observes that:
Provo City alleges that it is inequitable and unjust for this Commission to overrule a decision by a
United States Court. This Commission does not assume to have any such power or jurisdiction. This
Commission, however, is charged by statute with the
duty of determining whether public convenience and
necessity demand the opening of a road or highway
across the railroad tracks of Applicants and iS' exercising that jurisdiction in this Report and the Order
to be made pursuant thereto. Neither the United
States District Court nor the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals has passed upon the jurisdiction of this Commission in this matter (R. 32-3).
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The rules of law which control the problem here presented are, we believe, thes.e: Where issues of law are presented in controversies which are of an essentially private
character, courts of law are vested with a primary jurisdiction for the determination of such issues. Where, on the
other hand, issues which are of a public character and relate
to questions primarily of fact, arising from some activity of
a public utility, and are by statute vested in a regulatory
body, such as the Commission, are for the determination
of the Commission. A concurrent jurisdiction may thus exsist in which courts are entitled to pass upon questions of
law involving private rights and regulatory bodies, such as
the Commission, are entitled to pass upon questions of public
right involving matters of fact relating to utilities under
their control. There are and may be certain cases lying in
between the fields here suggested in which a court may have
the right to take original jurisdiction but in which the jurisdiction of a commission, when once assumed, is complete
and determinative of all issues involved.
An examination of the cases and text authority will, we
believe, fully sustain the rules above announced.
The general proposition is announced in 42 Am. J ur.,
Public Administrative Law, Sec. 252, as follows:
In some circumstances, two remedies may be
available to the same party for the enforcement of the
same right, one in the judicial and the other in the
administrative forum, one by virtue of statute and
the other under the common law ... There may exist
a dual remedy, one in the judicial and another in the
administrative forum, in a sense other than that just
described. Some administrative agencies exist only
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for the enforcement and protection of public, as distinguished from private, rights, and where an act
constitutes a violation of both a public and a private
right, the administrative forum may present the
proper remedy for the former and the judicial forum
the proper remedy for the latter.
The cases sustain this statement of law. Typical of several of such cases is that of City of Oakland v. Key System,
149 P. (2d) 195 (Cal.), where the court announces the principles as follows :
As previously stated, based upon the findings of
fact, the court as a conclusion of law found that the
use of the property described in the first cause of
action "is a matter primarily within the jurisdiction
of the Railroad Commission." Ordinarily this statement is correct. However, the jurisdiction is not exclusively with the commission. Questions of public
convenience and necessity, and matters directly relating thereto, in connection with the operation of
public utility franchises, are the concern of the commission; legal disputes pertaining to a continuance or
cancellation of a franchise at the end of its designated
period are solely within the jurisdiction of the courts.
The cancellation of a fanchise during the term of its
existence for a cause specified therein is primarily a
legal question and must be decided by the courts, but
if convenience of the public is involved and continued operation is necessary, such interest may be paramount to the rights of the parties to the franchise,
in which case the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission is dominant and controlling. A restriction
or limitation in one case may not apply under the
facts of another.
Thus, in certain cases and as to certain problems
relating to public utilities the jurisdiction of the commission is exclusive. As to other matters the regular
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law courts have jurisdiction. In between these two
well defined fields there is a somewhat ill defined
field in which the law courts have jurisdiction unless
the commission has elected to act as to the particular
subject matter. If it has elected to so act the exercise
of such jurisdiction ousts the law courts of any jurisdiction assumed by them. (p. 199.)
A !urther Calfornia case of particula:r interest is that
of Miller v. Railroad Commission, 70 P. (2d) 164. In this
case an injunction was secured in a state court and thereafter proceedings were taken before the California Railroad
Commission. As in the case at bar, the contention was made
that the action before the court was res judicata. The California Supreme Court held otherwise, citing in support of
the jurisdiction of the commission Section 31 of the California Public Utilities Act, which is ident~cal with Section 76-4-1
of our Code. The view of the California court under the
issues presented to it is that the assumption of jurisdiction
by the California commission had the effect of rendering
nugatory the judgment of the court theretofore entered,
which prior to the proceeding before the commission was
binding upon the parties. It is the position of defendants
that the issues before the Court and the Commission in this
case are of such a distinct character that the determination
of the law point in the Court is not abrogated by a decision
which the Commission might make closing the street crossing which is now in contemplation of law open. If, however,
the contention of the City in this case is valid that such an
order of the Commission would have the effect of abrogating
the decision of the federal court, then the decision of the
California Supreme Court in the Miller case is direct author-
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ity that such result is entirely immaterial once jurisdiction
of the Commission has attached. The California court in
reaching its decision says in part:
Applying the principles of law announced above,
we conclude that the superior court of the county of
Modoc had jurisdiction to render the judgment in
the case brought by petitioners and others against the
C. \V. Clarke Company, in which it was adjudged
that the company was a public utility and that the
plaintiffs in said action were the beneficiaries in the
use of the water devoted to public use by said utility.
We further hold that said judgment was valid and
binding upon the parties to said action until the Railroad Commission assumed jurisdiction of said utility
for the purpose of regulating its operations, and,
upon its assumption of jurisdiction over the activities of said utility, any order or judgment of the
superior court in conflict with the orders of the ,commission is to that extent ineffective and of no binding effect upon the parties thereto. This conclusion
must necessarily follow from the provisions of the
Constitution and the Public Utilities Act, and particularly from section 31 thereof, which provides that:
"The railroad commission is hereby vested with
power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public utility in the state and to do all things,
whether herein specifically designated or in addition
thereto, which are necessary and convenient in the
exercise of such power and jurisdiction."
The judgment of the superior court of Modoc
county was not therefore res judicata as to any right
of the plaintiffs as beneficiaries in the use of the
water devoted to a public use by the defendant in said
action as against the future consideration of said right
by the commission. When the Railroad Commission
assumed jurisdiction over said public utility, as it
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did at the time of the hearing of the application of
the Clarke Company to increase the rates for water
delivered to petitioners, which resulted in the order
of September 17, 1934, its jurisdiction over the activities of said utility was exclusive and plenary, except by the proceedings in review to this court, unhampered and unrestrained by the previous judgment of the superior court of the county of Modoc.
(p. 169.)
As illustrative of many other cases supporting the rule
announced above is that of Steele v. Clinton Electric Light
& Power Co., 193 Atl. 613 (Conn.) wherein the court held
that:
The fact that a public service commission has
jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes over
charges for service does not deprive equity of jurisdiction to enjoin the shutting off of service to coerce
payment of a disputed bill. (p. 616.)
The contention that the issues raised before the Commission by the application of Rio Grande are res judicata
is without merit.
POINT II

The contention of the City under this point is stated to
be that the Public Utilities Act does not give the Public Service Commission jurisdiction to order the closing of a public
street within a municipality. The statement of this proposition tends to raise an issue which is not actually presented. The question, as we see it, is whether the Public
Utilities Act confers jurisdiction on the Commission to close ::
the area of this city street which is crossed by railroad tracks il 1
here involved.
~~ ~
car
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As indicated in the City's brief, both the City and the
Commission derive their powers from the same source,
namely, the Legislature, and in the absence of a constitutional limitation, the Legislature has the clear power to confer upon the Commission the jurisdiction here questioned.
The statute under which the Commission undertakes to act
(Section 76-4-15) is broad and comprehensive. It provides
as follows:
(1) No track of any railroad shall be constructed across a public road, highway or street at
'grade, nor shall the track of any railroad corporation
be constructed across the track of any other railroad
or street railroad corporation at grade, nor shall the
track of a street railroad corporation be constructed
across the track of a railroad corporation at grade,
without the permission of the commission having
first been secured; provided, that this subsection
shall not apply to the replacement of lawfully existing tracks. The commission shall have the right to
refuse its permission or to grant it upon such terms
and conditions as it may prescribe.
{2) The Commission shall have the exclusive
power to determine and prescribe the manner, including the particular point of crossing, and the
terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use
and protection of each crossing of one railroad by
another railroad or street railroad, and of a street
railroad by a railroad and of each crossing of a public
road or highway by a railroad or street railroad, and
of a street by a railroad or vice versa, and to alter
or abolish any such crossing, to restrict the use of
such crossings to certain types of traffic in the interest of public safety and is vested with power and
it shall be its duty to designate the railroad crossings
to be traversed by school busses and motor vehicles
carrying passengers for hire, and to require, where

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
in its judgment it would be practicable, a separation
of grades at any such crossing heretofore or hereafter established, and to prescribe the terms upon
which such separation shall be made and the proportions in which the expense of the alteration or abolition of such crossings or the separation of such
grades shall be divided between the railroad or street
railroad corporations affected, or between such corporations and the state, county, municipality or other
public authority in interest.
( 3) Whenever the commission shall find that
public convenience and necessity demand the establishment, creation or ·construction of a crossing of a
street or highway over, under or upon the tracks or
lines of any public utility, the commission may by
order, decision, rule or decree require the establishment, construction or creation of such crossing, and
such crossing shall thereupon become a public highway and crossing.
Examining subparagraph (2) of said section and deletting unnecessary language, it seems clearly to read as follows:
(2) The Commission shall have the exclusive
power to determine and prescribe the manner . . .
of each crossing of a public road or highway by a
railroad or street railroad and of a street by a railroad or vice versa, and to alter or abolish any such
crossing.

;:it

The abolition of the crossing of a street by a railroad
or of a railroad by a street certainly can mean nothing more
than the closing of such crossing. 'The language of the statute could hardly be more clear or comprehensive.
The foregoing Section 76-4-15 was Section 14 of the
original Public Utilities Act of 1917, and has not been sub-
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stantially amended since its original enactment. By the provisions of Section 34 of the original act, all acts or parts
of acts inconsistent therewith are repealed.
The City relies upon the provisions of Section 15-8-8,
U. C. A. 1943, which are that,
They (cities) may lay out, establish, open, alter,
widen, narrow, extend, grade, pave or otherwise improve streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks,
parks, airports and public grounds, and may vacate
the same or parts thereof, by ordinance.
This section is of long standing. It runs back at least
to the Revised Statutes of 1898, where it substantially
appears as Subsections 8 and 88 of Section 206. Having been in force at the time of the passage of the
Public Utilities Act, the latter section was, to the extent
that it was inconsistent with that act, repealed. A careful
analysis will demonstrate, however, that the conflict between Sections 76-4-15 and 15-8-8 relates only to a particular problem, namely, crossings, and only to the extent of the
areas involved in crossings does the Legislature withdraw
from cities a power over streets enjoyed by them prior ·to
the passage of the Public Utilities Act.
The solution to any conflict between these sections and
the course of judicial determination with respect thereto
has been laid out and prescribed by two decisions of this
Court.
The first of such decisions is that of Denver and Rio
Grande Railroad Company v. Public Utilities Commission
of Utah, 51 Utah 623, 172 P. 479, which will hereafter be
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referred to as "the Rio Grande case". The other and later
decision is that of Union Pacific Railroad Company et al.
v. Public Service Commission, 103 Utah 186, 134 P. (2d)
469, hereafter referred to as "the Union Pacific case".
In the Rio Grande case the facts were that application
had been made to the Commission by the railroad for a crossing over a street within a municipality without the railroad's
having first obtained a franchise or authority from Salt Lake
City or Salt Lake County so to do. The Court held that the
statute conferring power upon the Commission, which is
Section 76-4-15 above quoted, was capable of only one construction and that all acts and parts of acts in conflict with
the statute were repealed, the language of.the Court being
as follows:
... Not only are the sections of the statute specifically mentioned in the act repealed, but "all acts
and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions
of this act" are repealed. Since the act, in language
so plain that it will admit of but one construction,
confers on the commission the exclusive power to determine and prescribe the manner, and the terms
upon which railroad companies may construct, maintain, and operate railroad tracks across public roads,
highways, and streets within the state and repeals
all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions conferring such power, but little need or can
be said on the subject, except that the commission
erred in declining to act on the application made by
the petitioner for crossing permits. (p. 480.)
The facts in the Union Pacific case were that Ogden City
had granted a franchise to Union Pacific to construct tracks
along a street for a distance of some 1.5 miles. The provi-
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sions of the franchise had not been complied with by the
railroad, and Ogden City revoked the franchise, whereupon
the railroad undertook to remove the tracks and the Commission assumed jurisdiction to prevent it from doing so.
This Court held that the matter of the crossing of railroad
tracks over city streets was exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Commission, whereas the matter of the constuction or maintenance of railroad tracks along city streets
under franchise was not granted to the Commission but remained in the city. Consequently the city, having the control of the granting of such franchises and such tracks, must
necessarily have like control over the revocation of such franchises and the Commission was without jurisdiction in the
premises, the meat of the Court's decision being found in its
language as follows :
... As we view the matter, therefore, said Section 76-4-15, while it was intended to give to the
Commission power over street crossings within cities
and towns, and did give it such power, nevertheless,
did not repeal the general powers theretofore conferred upon municipalities to control the use and occupancy of their streets by railroads. Such power was
originally conferred by the Legislature upon municipalities; it has not been expressly repealed, and we
do not find anything in subsequent legislation which
is clearly and manifestly repugnant to that power.
It therefore remains in municipalities where it was
originally placed. (p. 198.)
From these decisions these propositions therefore appear to be established : the control of railroad crossings over
streets or streets over railroads is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Commission ; the control of railroad fran-
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chises to operate upon and along streets has not been taken
from the cities by the Legislature and still remains in the
municipality.
'The control of crossings, by the express provision of
the statute above quoted, clothes the Commission with power
not only to regulate but to close such crossings. Here, then,
is a grant of power as clear in its terms as could be expressed; and that power may be exercised by the Commission unless a constitutional restraint exists.
POINT III
The position of the City under this point appears to be
that if said Section 76-4-15 grants power in the Commission
to close a street, such grant of power is unconstitutional.

:·n+

:a.

The statement· of the City under this point is broader
than the problem presented. The problem presented is actually whether the power granted by the Legislature to the
Commission under said section to close a street area occupied by rail crossings is constitutional. Stated in its simplest form, as we see it, the problem is whether the Commission may constitutionally close the crossing here involved.
The determination of this question requires a consideration
of certain basic problems.

The City assumes that but one public highway is· here :~~u
involved, namely, Ninth South Street in Provo. The fact ~~tl
is that several public highways are involved. That railroads
are public highways of commerce is now so firmly estab- ~111
lished by numerous decisions that no citation is here neces- 'dlat
sary. It is upon the fundamental proposition that ralroads 't'li/i
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are public highways of commerce that the power of public
regulation of railroads rests. We are not inclined to minimize the importance of city streets as public highways.
However, it should also be recognized that railroads are
likewise highways of the greatest importance, not only to
local communities and the several states but also to the
nation as well. We therefore have here involved not· a question of a street highway alone but actually a question of
conflict in use of a portion of space between a street highway and rail highways.
With the development of rail highways in our national
economy, it became inevitable that these highways should
cross street highways and vice versa. These crossings necessarily precipitated conflicts. and contests for the use of
space at the points of intersection. The controversies involving as they did broad questions of state and national
concern, and necessitating the balancing and weighing of
convenience and necessity to the users of both street and
rail highways, it was essential that these cont:r:oversies be
withdrawn from municipalities or other local bodies and
that they be vested in tribunals especially created for their
consideration. The tribunals thus created were regulatory
bodies such as the Commission.

llb

.
1

The statute (Section 76-4-15) here assailed on constitutional grounds by the City grants the Commission broad
powers with respect to rail and highway crossings. Under
.the powers so granted, this Court has held that the Commission may require a city to share its street space with a rail
highway at the point of crossing. (D. & R. G. R. R. Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission of Utah, supra.) The City con-
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cedes the power of the Commission in this respect. In this
concession it seems to this defendant that the City actually
concedes the power of the Commission to close a crossing. It
is elementary that a railroad may not actually enjoy joint
use with others of the intersecting space between its rails
and a street. A vehicle may not use street space at the same
time as does a railroad without loss of life and property to
both users. The rails necessarily require exclusive use of
the space at such time, and for the times of such use the
street is closed to vehicles and pedestrians. We would suppose, also, that no contention would be made by the City that
the Commission would not have the power to barricade or
otherwise effectively enforce the closing of the crossing
during the periods of railroad use. It is but an extension in
degree of this power of withdrawal of use to conclude that
the Commission shall have the power to withdraw use of the
contested space entirely from vehicles and pedestrians and
order that such space shall be devoted entirely to rail highway use--in short, that the crossing shall be closed.
The City contends that the Commission has power to
compel rail highways to share crossing space with street
highways. There would seem to be no doubt of the power
of the Commission in this respect. The City, while admitting
the power of the Commission to open a crossing, strenuously
denies the power of the Commission to close a crossing. A
brief exploration will, we believe, demonstrate the fallacy
of the City's position in this respect. Assume that the Commission orders the opening of a crossing. Thereafter rail
traffic at the point of crossing increases ten fold in volume.
At the same time, through construction of other highway
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facilities, street traffic dwindles to a mere trickle. The considerations of public convenience and necessity which required the crossing to be opened no longer exist. Is the Commission without power to control what it has done and restore the crossing space to the exclusive use of the rail highway?
In the case at bar, by public user a street highway existed over an area crossed by a rail highway. Now, through
the industrialization of certain Utah communities, twentyone tracks cross the street where in 1943 but eight tracks
existed. The volume of railroad traffic has expanded tremendously. The City and the Rio Grande have through their
own acts altered the crossing and provided the public with
another street for r
·Tt lieu of and in extension of the
street area now phys... _. .y closed. Is the Commission, in the
light of these facts, without power to say that this crossing
space shall be devoted exclusively to rail highways?
These considerations, we believe, enable us to determine
the constitutional problem here presented.
We have not one but two constitutional provisions to be
considered. The City has cited Article VI, Section 29, which
provides that :
The Legislature shall not delegate to any special
commission, private corporation or association, any
power to make, supervise or interfere with any
municipal improvement, money, property or effects,
whether held in trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to
select a capitol site, or to perform any municipal function.
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Consideration should, however, also be given to Section
12 of Article XII, which provides that:
All railroad and other transportation companies
are declared to be common carriers, and subject to
legislative control; and such companies shall receive
and transport each other's passeng7rs and freight,
without discrimination or unnecessary delay.
The City contends that the reference to municipal function in the first article above relates to the laying out, establishment, opening and vacating of streets. Assuming
that such authority over streets is a municipal function, we
believe it clear that this power of a municipality over strbets
is a power which relates in a general way to the control of
the municipality over its streets. It is such a power as was
referred to and considered by this Court in Union Pacific
Railroad Co. et al. v. Public Service Commission, supra. Quite
distinct, however, from this general power of cities over
streets is the special problem of rail and street crossings.
This, as we have shown, is not a problem of local government
but essentially a problem in which broad state and national
considerations are involved. The problem of crossings, because of the state and national considerations involved, is in
its final analysis a problem of the control and regulation of
rail highways. Because of this nature of the problem, the
framers of the Constitution saw fit to vest control of that
problem in the Legislature by the provisions of Section 12
of Article XII above quoted. This solution is the logical
result of the underlying philosophy which distinguishes the
Union Pacific case from the Rio Grande case cited supra.
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The City's brief serves to confuse rather than clarify
the problem. The City asserts that the control of streets is
a municipal function, not to be exercised by the Commission.
At the same time the City contends that the Commission may
lay out, establish, or open streets over rail highways, which,
by its own reasoning, would obviously be a municipal function.
This confusion on the part of the City demonstrates to
this defendant that the problem of rail crossings as such is
not a municipal problem and was never intended by the
framers of the Constitution to be such. The problem of rail
crossings is entirely distinct from the general powers of
cities over streets and is a special problem, bound· up with
considerations of railroad transportation over which the
Legislature, by the provisions of Section 12 of Article XII,
very properly retained control.
We have examined the cases ·cited by the City in itS
brief. The case of City of Chicago v. Hastings Express Co.
et al., 17 N. E. (2d) 576, 369 Ill. 610, was cited by City under
its Point II. We believe the case is not authority under that
point but is of importance in connection with the consideration of Point III. The Illinois Supreme Court holds that the
city license there sustained is not a regulatory ordinance but
merely a revenue ordinance. The court further points out
that the Public Utilities Act of Illinois was designed to vest
in the Commerce Commission of that state exclusive jurisdiction over those matters which are an intimate part of
and of the closest connection with the public utility service
and with transportation itself. That the matter of rail
crossings is closely connected with and bears directly upon
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rail transportation should admit of no doubt. The federal
court, in the action before it, found that the opening and
continuation of Ninth South Street across the railroad yards
and tracks here involved would make necessary much slower
handling of trains and parts of trains in said yards and
would reduce the usefulness and efficiency of the same to
the extent of approximately fifty per cent, and would greatly
increase the cost of operation of the railroads, in addition
to causing a serious danger to the public (R. 6-7). This
serves to demonstrate that the problems here presented
bear directly and intimately upon the movement of commerce over rail highways and are therefore problems directly within the jurisdiction of the Commission.
The decision in Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission, 72 Utah 536, 271 P. 961, is, in our opinion, not in point.
The question there presented was one of the jurisdiction of
the Commission over municipal power plants. This Court
found upon careful analysis that such jurisdiction would
necessarily have a direct bearing upon money, property and
taxes of the municipality. No problem such as here presented was involved.
We have considered the remaining cases cited by the
City from other jurisdictions. They do not seem to us to be
controlling or of particular assistance in the solution of our
problem. We shall therefore not extend this brief to cover
an analysis of these decisions.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore concluded that the contentions of the City
are without merit; that the Commissio:p. has lawful juris-
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diction of the issues raised by the application of the Rio
Grande now before it; and that the demurrer of the Rio
Grande to the City's petition for a permanent writ of prohibition should be sustained and this action dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,

Attorneys for Defendant The Denver and
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company.
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